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China’s Glee 
May 11, 2010 in Uncategorized by The China Beat | 1 comment 
By William A. Callahan 
Since mid-2009, China has become much more assertive in world affairs, taking positions that 
challenge the US and Europe on numerous fronts including climate change, exchange rates, nuclear 
Iran, cyber security, and human rights. This list of problems came as a surprise to the many experts 
who for the past decade have been telling us that China’s peaceful rise demonstrates that Beijing has 
been socialized into the international system as a responsible actor. 
Yet recent events suggest that ‘responsible stakeholder’ is not China’s preferred goal. The PRC is in 
the midst of a transition, shifting from trying to fit into the international system, to confidently – even 
arrogantly – asserting itself as the newest great power. 
Martin Jacques, author of When China Rules the World, tells us that we shouldn’t be surprised at 
China’s new assertiveness: it is merely returning to a Chinese-style of global governance. We need to 
understand this new situation in terms of China’s own concepts about foreign relations, rather than 
Eurocentric theories of diplomacy. Thus along with economic power shifting from West to East, he and 
others argue that intellectual power is shifting from Europe and America to China. 
I agree that a change is taking place, but am not convinced that it is a grand continental shift from a 
Western to a Chinese world order. Rather, what we are witnessing is a dramatic transition from the 
PRC’s elite political culture (Marxism and/or Confucianism) to the global popular culture that China 
shares with the rest of the world. 
Simply put, Beijing is not presenting a distinct ‘China model’ of development and justice; the PRC is 
joining the world society of consumers who not only purchase computers and televisions, but also 
consume the images and roles that are presented on-screen in film, TV and video. China’s new 
worldview thus is shaped more by media products than by grand ideologies. 
To understand China we need to look beyond Marxism, Liberalism and Confucianism to cultural 
phenomena such as Glee, the fantastically successful American TV show that is conquering the world 
with its mix of song and dance, comedy and drama. 
 
For those of us who are stuck in the elite mode of understanding world politics (or don’t have teenage 
kids), I’ll summarize the remarkable Glee experience; the program has won both popular and critical 
acclaim, including the Peabody and Golden Globe awards for best television show. 
In many ways, Glee is a typical American high school drama that pits cool kids against losers – here a 
collection of geeks, gimps, drama-queens, minorities and other ‘outsiders’. These teenagers are all 
experiencing rapid and dramatic transitions. They know they are changing, but aren’t sure what they 
are changing into, or even what they want to become. Glee’s spin on this familiar dramatic formula is 
to solve the problems of adolescence through song.  The outsiders (plus a few insiders) seek shelter 
from the problems of school and family in William McKinley High School’s aptly-named ‘New 
Directions’ glee club. By working hard towards a shared goal, they overcome a host of obstacles – 
finally winning the sectional competition against other schools for the show’s mid-season climax. 
Just what does a glee club in Lima, Ohio have to do with the rise of China? 
Like the teenagers in Glee, China is an emerging power that is experiencing a fantastic growth spurt. 
This rapid economic growth is changing more than its per capita GDP; it is changing the way Chinese 
people think about themselves, and about the world. Many are asking how Beijing can convert its new 
economic power into enduring political and cultural influence. Their various answers are evidence of a 
heady mix of excitement and uncertainty about China’s future – and the world’s future. 
This anxiety of possibility is described as ‘China’s struggle for status’ by Chinese-American scholar 
Yong Deng. The PRC is experimenting with the international system, searching for China’s proper role 
in foreign affairs. Recent diplomatic controversies testify to how Beijing is trying out international 
system’s rules, which it had little part in making, much like a teenager would try on a dress for her 
junior prom. Do the norms of the international system fit? Can they satisfy Beijing’s desires for 
greatness? Or do they need to be tailored? 
This argument may seem far-fetched, but the deputy-director of Beijing’s Olympic ceremonies also 
pointed to status, love and desire when he explained his country’s goals for hosting the 2008 games: 
‘I really hope that the people of the world can get to know the Chinese culture through [the Opening 
Ceremony], to understand China, to intimately know China, to love China, and to desire China’. 
China thus is eager to please international audiences. Yet Beijing’s new foreign policy is still quite 
awkward. It mixes intemperate outbursts with clumsy explanations whenever Beijing doesn’t get the 
foreign recognition it feels China deserves. China’s policy-makers and opinion-shapers are still getting 
used exercising both the raw force of their new economic and military strength and the charms of 
their growing soft power. 
While many Western commentators tell us that China has been socialized into an international society 
that is governed by rules and norms, many of their counterparts in the PRC describe world politics as 
a dog-eat-dog Darwinian survival of the fittest. International law here is not as important as the law of 
the jungle; international relations is guided by power politics, which is as brutally anarchic as school 
yard politics. Chinese commentators thus commonly understand foreign affairs in terms of bullying: as 
PLA General Pan Zhenqiangexplains, ‘China once made outstanding contributions to world civilization. 
But, in modern times, it has been bullied by foreign powers, and is still to some degree being bullied’. 
The popular slogan, ‘backward countries will be beaten’, doesn’t question this violent international 
hierarchy; rather, the lesson that China takes is that it needs to be strong to fight back. 
Like outsiders in high school, some in China see themselves as underdogs in the world system, and 
view their country as the ‘Sick Man of Asia’ that suffered a Century of National Humiliation (1840-
1949) at the hands of European and Japanese imperialism. The current ‘rejuvenation of China’ (to 
quote Beijing’s popular slogan) involves overcoming numerous obstacles that were created by people 
described as domestic traitors and foreign enemies. Victory (and defeat) are total in this zero-sum 
game: bully or be bullied, humiliate or be humiliated. 
While Glee’s creators describe their show as an escapist fantasy that shows the optimistic yes-we-can 
spirit of high school students, discussions of international politics in the PRC are more pessoptimist, 
mixing China’s national pride with its enduring sense of international humiliation. Beijing’s new 
aggressive foreign policy certainly comes from China’s dreams of global glory; but it also comes from 
China’s nightmares of failure and revenge. 
I don’t want to belabor this analogy of blossoming adolescence and emerging powers. It is certainly 
problematic to call any country ‘immature’ because this assumes that the world’s current great powers 
maturely and rationally follow the rules. As the Bush administration demonstrated, we can’t take 
mature global leadership for granted. But Glee can help us here too: it also shows how adults can be 
manipulative and hypocritical when they try to make the system work for themselves. 
Understanding China’s shifting feelings is important because the PRC is no longer an underdog: This 
glee club has nukes. 
China is one of the top players in global economics and politics. But its school yard notion of world 
politics that is quick to take offense means that the twenty-first century promises to be an interesting 
time. Things will get worse before they get better: the populist struggle over who will lead China after 
Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao retire in 2012 is further complicating China’s uneasy relationship with the 
world. 
In other words, as long as China continues to grow like a teenager, it is likely to act with an 
adolescent’s supreme confidence – and deep self-doubt. 
To grasp the new international dynamic presented by China’s rise, it is necessary to look beyond 
Beijing’s official statements to see how the Chinese people feel about their country and the world (a 
question that surely has a variety of answers). To do this we need to examine how the issues of 
emerging powers (in both high school and world affairs) are framed in popular culture globally and in 
China itself. 
Glee has transcended its Midwestern small-town setting to become a global media phenomenon: it has 
taken Europe and Latin America by storm, and is popular in the black market DVD shops of 
Guangzhou and Shanghai. China’s public diplomacy is likewise reaching beyond East Asia to charm 
audiences in Africa and Latin America. 
McKinley High’s glee club just won sectionals and is looking to the regionals. Can they go all the way? 
Will Glee conquer Asia? Will China mature to be the next superpower? 
Stay tuned. 
William A. Callahan is Professor of International Politics at the University of Manchester, and author 
of China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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